The use and abuse of arguments
Philosophy vs soteriology
Reading an anthology about Buddhism and free will recently in preparation for another essay, I came across an articulation of something I’d been thinking about:
Gowans concludes, however, that if Buddhism must pronounce on any theoretical position, it would only be justified as ‘skillful means’—the doctrine whereby beliefs, speech, and actions otherwise known by the wise to be avoided may be justified if they have soteriological utility, a view shared by Goodman—but Buddhism nevertheless would remain silent on the metaphysics.
However, a Buddhist ethical theory might be soteriologically justified, yet Buddhism has none, except recently. Additionally, whatever justifies the many extant Buddhist (often metaphysical) theories of intentionality, phenomenology, and so on, arguably justifies free will theory. Arguably, these theories arose historically against competing views, and are thereby soteriologically warranted.
Rick Repetti. Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will. Introduction (pg 2).
Soteriology here refers to a set of practices, beliefs etc that lead to liberation. This paragraph refers to the question of what criteria we should use to evaluate any specific metaphysical claims that a Buddhist might make. A soteriological justification is a kind of pragmatic or consequentialist criterion - that we should evaluate any set of claims Buddhism makes not based on whether or not they are true in some ultimate sense, but rather whether adopting these claims in an appropriate way (e.g. establishing a meditative View, performing a ritual as if) leads to a good outcome, like nirvana, arhatship, Buddhahood etc.
To make it concrete, let’s take a Buddhist metaphysical claim - the loving quality of the Ground of Being, dharmakaya etc that Tibetans argue about in the rangtong / shentong controversy. Some Buddhists will go around saying, based on direct experience, that loving awareness is the ground from which all experience arises and then try to defend that claim philosophically. If the only thing that matters is direct experience and the pragmatic criterion of whether believing in this is useful in achieving liberation, why do different schools of Tibetan Buddhism spend so much time arguing about it? More generally, why argue about philosophy at all? Why not just point to a view’s pragmatic value instead?
The problem, I think, is that there is some relationship between the believability of a given metaphysical system and the degree to which that system can be used in a co-creation process with meditative experience in sustaining a View. In other words, if we choose a way of looking that seems totally implausible to us, it’s going to be harder to take the View required for meditative insight to bear fruit. This isn’t to say you need rock solid belief (as I’ve written about before), but there needs to be enough possibility to work with. That’s why a variety of Buddhist teachers will present scientific or psychological evidence for the mind-constructedness (emptiness to use the Buddhist term) of experience, or for their model of mind specifically1. This need for plausibility is why in some traditions there are a succession of Views one takes as one's practice develops.2
However, in presenting that evidence, there’s a danger that a way of seeing can become more than just a view we skillfully take up when appropriate. There’s a danger that we build an edifice of unshakeable belief atop evidence. What happens if the evidence changes or is invalidated (a frequent outcome for scientific theories)? Or what happens if we hear a persuasive philosophical argument on the other side of some issue (of which there are an endless variety3)? Then our edifice crumbles - ironically the more we try to fully ground our beliefs in evidence, the more fragile our belief becomes. Consequently we need to hold our views lightly enough4 that they don’t ossify, but explore the philosophical arguments to the point where they become sufficiently psychoactive5 that they can form the basis for lived experience. For those of us who enjoy argument, that can, unfortunately, require a lot of exploration. But if you aren’t such a person, consider yourself lucky!6
Lots of Buddhist systems rest atop elaborate models of how the mind works. The Four Noble Truths is the simplest examples of this, specifically the psychological theory that suffering comes from grasping after phenomenon. In some Theravadin models, the very act of making raw sensory experience into an object in the first place creates that grasping and thus suffering. Therefore, the only way to end suffering is to experience a special kind of cessation of experience.
An example is the View that everything is perfect primordially / fundamentally - a hard view for most people to hold, for obvious reasons.
This essay makes the argument, persuasively, that most views have adherents that are smarter than you who make very strong arguments you can’t easily refute.
The view can, paradoxically, become stronger in direct experience if it is more loosely held — this is a kind of anti-fragility. When I consider a strong argument against a favored view it creates a feeling of humility about what I can know that deepens my respect for life’s fundamental mystery.
A lot of powerful arguments are psychoactive in this way - consider Peter Singer’s drowning baby case, which has inspired so many utilitarians. I have a number of problems with the argument, but it’s undeniable that considering the argument inspires a certain kind of powerful feeling in me, that demands some sort of response.
This reminds me of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as a kind of therapy, and his suggestion that the goal of philosophical inquiry is to free ourselves from it, like the fly freeing itself from the fly bottle. It also reminds me in my own writing to maybe spend less time offering various arguments and instead offer more concrete practice tips!